Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 29

Issue 1

Article 13

January 2003

Security and the Economy in the North American Context: The
Road Ahead for NAFTA - U.S. Speaker
Gary C. Hufbauer
Yee Wong

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj

Recommended Citation
Gary C. Hufbauer and Yee Wong, Security and the Economy in the North American Context: The Road
Ahead for NAFTA - U.S. Speaker, 29 Can.-U.S. L.J. 53 (2003)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol29/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law Journal by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

SECURITY AND THE ECONOMY IN THE NORTH AMERICAN
CONTEXT: THE ROAD AHEAD FOR NAFTA
Gary C. Hujbauer and Yee Wongt
U.S. Speaker
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in
January 1994, broke new ground in the crowded field of free trade
agreements (FTAs): it was the first major FTA between a developing country
(Mexico) and developed countries (the United States and Canada). NAFTA
confronted skeptics at its inception and still faces many today. Nevertheless,
the agreement contributed to a sharp expansion of trade and investment
between the United States and Mexico.
Two-way US-Mexico trade
expanded from $79 billion in 1993 to $220 billion in 2002, growth of 178
percent, about 2.75 times faster than US trade with non-NAFTA countries.1
NAFTA was instrumental in boosting foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Mexico as well, both directly by removing barriers on ownership, and
indirectly by eliminating tariffs on industrial components. The investment
surge in fact started before NAFTA was implemented. During the period
1990 to 2001, the US FDI stock placed in Mexico increased from $10 billion
to $56 billion, helping to make Mexico the host of more FDI ($116 billion
from all countries) than all developing countries except China ($395 billion
total) and Brazil ($219 billion total).2
For both Canada and Mexico, proximity to the United States dominates
economic and political life, ensuring that agreements with the United States
are a central priority. The post 9/11, post-Iraq challenge for NAFTA partners
is to advance their agendas of economic integration when US attention is
Gary Clyde Hufbauer is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Institute for
International Economics. Yee Wong is a Research Assistant at the Institute for International
Economics.
Before NAFTA, Mexico was the third-largest market for US exports and the
third-largest supplier of US imports. By 2001, it was second in both categories. The CBO
estimates that NAFTA increased US merchandise exports to Mexico by amounts ranging from
2.2 percent ($1.1 billion) in 1994 to 11.3 percent ($10.3 billion) in 2001. The same study
estimates that NAFTA increased US merchandise imports from Mexico by amounts ranging
from 1.9 percent ($0.9 billion) in 1994 to 7.7 percent ($9.4 billion) in 2001. In our view, these
estimates understate the impact of NAFTA.
2 US FDI is a much larger factor in Mexico than either China or Brazil. In 2001, China
hosted $11 billion and Brazil hosted $35 billion in FDI stock from the United States,
respectively.
See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003);
UNCTAD, United Nations World Investment Report, (2003).
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centered on the Middle East, and when Canada and Mexico harbor
reservations about the broader doctrine of military pre-emption.3 Since the
United States is both less motivated and more distracted, advancing the
NAFTA agenda will depend on joint Canadian and Mexican initiatives.
Their proposals should be ambitious enough to inspire visionary leadership,
but flexible enough to accommodate the political realities of North America.
In the short term, NAFTA will probably advance furthest in areas that
have security overtones. Energy and migration are two topics that clearly
qualify. Longer-term NAFTA projects should include improvements to the
dispute settlement systems, joint financial regulation, and more open services
sectors. Sensitive agriculture questions, over trade in corn, beans, sugar,
lumber and wheat, will need to be thrashed out on an issue-by-issue basis.
BORDER SECURITY
Canada and Mexico are the first and second largest trading partners for
the United States. Consequently they are not only the largest source of US
merchandise imports but also the leading export market for most US states.4
In 2002, two-way US-Canada merchandise trade reached $370 billion, while
US-Mexico trade totaled $220 billion. Much of this trade originates in, or is
destined for, establishments owned by US investors in Canada and Mexico.
These commercial flows are highly sensitive to cross-border congestion,
which can increase sharply in a security alert. Some 75 percent of bilateral
US-Canadian merchandise trade moves through five border crossings: one in
British Columbia and four in Ontario. Border closures are estimated to cost
Canada $25,000 per minute in lost production.5 Two or three additional
border shutdowns, of the sort that occurred after September 11, could have a
telling impact on business plans to establish new plants in Canada.6 The
same is true for Mexico.
3 In the UN debate, both Canada and Mexico signaled disagreement with US military
action against Iraq. Differences with US foreign policy decisions have already had spillover
effects in trade policy vis-h-vis other countries. When Chile voted against the UN resolution,
to cite the most prominent example, signatures on the US-Chile FTA were delayed for one
month. The implicit signal from Washington is that open opposition by NAFTA partners to
US security policy could delay closer economic relations in North America.
4 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Gustavo Vega-Canovas, Wither NAFTA: A Common
Frontier?, reprintedin Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., THE REBORDERING OF
NORTH AMERICA: INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION IN A NEW SECURITY CONTEXT. New York and
London: Routledge (2003).
5 Wendy Dobson, Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space: A
Frameworkfor Action, TORONTO: CD HOWE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY, No. 162, THE BORDER
PAPERS, April 2002.

Danielle Goldfarb and William B.P. Robson, Risky Business: US Border Security and
the Threat to CanadianExports, TORONTO: CD HOWE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY, No. 177, THE
6
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To improve the management of the US-Canadian border (8,890
kilometers) and the US-Mexican border (3,326 kilometers), the United States
negotiated with Canada the "Smart Borders" plan and with Mexico the
"Border Partnership Action Plan." These have alleviated border delays. The
US Homeland Security Department plans to implement a high-tech entry/exit
system during 2003 at airports and seaports, and at the 50 largest land entry
points during 2004. 7 Canada similarly implemented measures to improve
border patrols, and has spent almost $180 million to purchase new security
technology and hire critical personnel. Mexico has helped improve border
security by sharing information about visa screening, by enhancing
cargo-security, and by expanding the use of the SENTRI program that
provides pre-clearance passes for low-risk travelers along the southern
border.8
After September 11, joint US-Canada initiatives were packaged to
facilitate personal travel and cross-border merchandise trade. NEXUS,
coordinated by US and Canadian customs and immigration agencies, enables
faster border crossings for low-risk travelers. The FAST program was
established to expedite customs clearance for cargo.
As an intermediate goal, the authorities should encourage all
multiple-entry US-Canada and US-Mexico travelers to obtain NEXUS
passes. Likewise FAST ports of entry and enrolment centers should seek to
accommodate around 80 percent of merchandise trade at both borders,
compared to around 15 percent of US-Canada trade today. 9 The first secure
fast lane in El Paso/Juarez should be accompanied by additional fast
crossings along the US-Mexico border.'0
MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION
The NAFTA migration story has two major dimensions: one is the
relationship between security and bilateral border crossings; the other
concerns illegal migration of Mexican workers into the United States.
Unfortunately the perception has taken root in the US public that the
BORDER PAPERS, March 2003.
7 Dobson, supra note 5.

8 Mexico agreed to participate in the less ambitious 22-point agreement, known as with

the Border Partnership accord, with the United States. The Border Partnership agreement is
expected to cost $25 million.
9 In May 2003, the Canadian and US governments added six new FAST ports of entry and
five FAST commercial driver registration centers. Six new NEXUS land border crossings will
be in operation by September 2003. See, Canada and United States Announce Expansion of
FAST and NEXUS Programs, CANADA CUSTOMS AND REVENUE AGENCY, Press Release, May
9, 2003.
10 Alongside regional North American security initiatives, the United States is working
internationally under the umbrella Operation Safe Commerce.
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US-Canada border is porous." The US concern is that Canada's general
immigration policies are less demanding, allowing people to enter who may
have been denied entry into the United States.' 2 Canada's comparatively
liberal treatment of refugee claimants also fosters the perception that
dangerous persons might enter the United States through Canada. 13
US-Mexico migration problems are not new. Since NAFTA was
implemented in 1994, the number of unauthorized Mexicans living in the
United States has almost doubled from about 2.5 million in 1995 to about 4.54
million in 2000, representing an annual increase of 400,000 a year.'
Conditions endured by many Mexicans working in the United States, and
desperate attempts to cross the border, are both sensitive political issues in
Mexico. Before and after September 11, President Fox has tried to engage
the Bush Administration on immigration issues.5 Fox made his task more
difficult by opposing US military action in Iraq.'
Stepping away from the North American scene, the European Union (EU)
provides an example for achieving a coherent immigration policy in a free
trade area. The founding Treaty of Paris (1957) guaranteed free movement
of labor, but for several decades this was a paper pledge. The EU took
concrete steps to develop Community rules on residency and work permit
rights in the Schengen Agreement (1985) and later under the Maastricht
Treaty (1992).
In a similar spirit, NAFTA is beginning to configure its internal border
checks so as to distinguish between citizens of NAFTA countries and
non-NAFTA nationals.
Canada and the United States have already
implemented high-tech identity cards for permanent residents and
pre-clearance programs for frequent travelers, known as lNSPASS at airports
" During a parliamentary hearing in November 2001, Canadian Foreign Minister John
Manley confirmed that this "urban legend" circulates in the United States. See, Chipello,
Heinzl, and Baglole, CanadaDenies Any Links To Sept. 11 Attacks in U.S., THE WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2001, at A10.
12 This concern is based on the December 1999 episode of Ahmed Ressam, who attempted
to cross the British Columbia-Washington state border with bombs destined for US
millennium celebrations.
13 After the U.S. Department of Homeland Security required all male visitors from a list of
25 mostly Arab and Muslim countries to register with the US government, the Canadian
government was flooded with refugee claims. In 2002, a third of the 45,000 asylum seekers in
Canada entered via the United States.
14 US-Mexico migration is part of a larger worldwide trend. According to one estimate,
the number of migrants worldwide is around 175 million persons, representing about three
percent of the world population. See, Philip Martin, Mexican-US Migration, reprintedin Gary
Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott. Forthcoming. NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal,
WASHINGTON DC: INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.

15 Fox's position reflected overwhelming public sentiment in Mexico.
While this was
understood in the Bush White House, the divergence on security policy did not foster closer
relations.
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and CANPASS at land borders.16 Similar passes should be extended to cover
visitors arriving from Mexico. Other initiatives should include common rules
for crossing external borders, and harmonization of rules for visas and entry.
Immigration policies are distinctly different between the United States
and Canada. Canada's point system is designed to choose skilled immigrants
(60 percent), whereas US immigration policy favors family reunification
(64 percent).' 7 In Mexico, immigration legislation has gradually liberalized
the entry of certain categories of foreigners, particularly to facilitate the entry
of business visitors, investors, technicians and professionals. Given their
deep-seated differences, the NAFTA partners are not likely to agree on
common immigration criteria for many decades. Indeed, within Europe, each
member country still determines its own policy with respect to extra-EU
immigrants.
The more immediate and sensitive issue is migrant workers, especially
illegal immigrants. Mexico is ranked first and Canada fourth as source
countries for illegal immigration into the United States.' 8 The pattern of
flows is dominated by demography and structural differences among NAFTA
partners. The biggest flows are between Mexico and the United States.
Mexico's labor force is young (average age 27), whereas the US labor force
is older (average age 39). The wage differential between the United States
and Mexico is about eight or nine to one. 9 Given the wage and age
differences between the United States and Mexico, it is not surprising that
many Mexicans seek work in the north.
It might seem that the migration pressures will be unrelenting for decades
to come. However, Philip Martin (2003) has outlined demographic and
economic reasons why Mexico-US migration pressures should fall between
16

While the NEXUS program facilitates pre-clearance for low-risk travelers along land

borders, the INSPASS program acts as an airport EZ-pass that scans hands to confirm that
travelers are citizens with no criminal background. The INSPASS automated immigration
inspection system takes about 20 seconds. Similarly, the CANPASS program extends
pre-clearance of low-risk persons traveling by air, boat, or through land border crossings. In
May 2003, the United States and Canada announced the CANPASS-Air (limited to Canadians
only) and NEXUS-Air projects, which use high-tech iris scanners at airports to expedite the
customs process for low-risk travelers.
17 Relative to its population size, Canada also offers more generous, skill-based permanent
residency, and ultimately citizenship, than the United States. See, Peter Rekai, Peter, US and
CanadianImmigration Policies: Marching Together to Different Tunes, TORONTO: CD HOWE
INSTITUTE COMMENTARY, No. 171, THE BORDER PAPERS, Nov. 2002.
18 Pia M. Orrenius and Alan d. Viard Presentation to the Board of Directors of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Research Dept., The Second Great Migration: Economic and Policy
Implications, (March 2000).
19 The wage differential in agriculture is huge. In 2000, the daily wage for farm work in
Mexico was $3.60 compared to the US average of $66.32. See, Steven Zahniser and
Florencino Trevino, Hired Farm Labor: Comparing the US and Mexico, USDA AG.
OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb. 2001; Also see, "Open Border" Report, PBS NEwsHOUR, Aug. 25, 2000.
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2005 and 2010. Martin explains that, as the rate of new Mexican entrants to
the labor force drops by 50 percent between 1996 and 2010, with proper
policies sustained economic growth should create enough new jobs to hold
the great majority of new workers in Mexico.
Mexican demographics and economics may work according to Martin's
model. Nevertheless, an immigration accord now would create mutual
benefits. First and foremost, an accord would ameliorate some of the
tensions and perhaps avert greater fortification of the 3,326 km US-Mexican
border. Second, estimates suggest three-fourths of all new US jobs in the
coming decade will be in the services and retail industry, where there is
considerable demand for relatively low skilled labor. Some of these jobs can
be filled by Mexicans.2 °
Martin proposes that a US-Mexico immigration accord should feature
pilot guest worker programs that offer temporary work permits. 2 1 This is
similar to the recommendation of Hufbauer and Vega-Casanovas (2003).
According to Martin's plan, a US employer could initiate a guest worker
visa. In turn, visa holders would be refunded part of their Social Security
and Unemployment Insurance payments once the worker returned to Mexico
and surrendered the visa.22
Also calling for urgent attention is the status of the 4.5 million
unauthorized Mexicans who already live and work in the United States. We
do not have a magic solution.
The foundation for our tentative
recommendations is the proposition that these people have made permanent
homes in the United States and they are not going to pick up their lives and
return to Mexico. Under appropriate circumstances, therefore, they should
be granted residence permits with eligibility for citizenship.
The
circumstances we envisage have two components - a threshold relating to the
total number of illegal crossings, and standards for individual applicants.
Provided that both governments certify that illegal crossings are less than,
say, 100,000 annually, then Mexican residents living in the United States for
five years or more, with no criminal
record, would be eligible for residence
23
citizenship.
eventual
and
permits
In addition to these measures to expand the flow of legal migrant workers
across the border and regularize the status of those living in the United
20

21
22

Orrenius and Viard, supra note 18.
Martin, supra note 14.
For information about reforming the current US H-2A and H-2B programs, adapting the

US L-1 visa option, and seasonal agricultural guest worker programs, refer to Martin (2003).
In the US Congress, the House International Relations Committee proposed linking an
immigration accord with the opening of PEMEX, Mexico's state-run oil company. But
Mexican President Fox quickly rejected the proposal.
Dow Jones (2003);
SourceMex (2003).
23 Hufbauer and Vega-Casanovas, supra note 4.
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States, we recommend a joint border patrol program operated by Mexico and
the United States to stem the surge of illegal migrants looking for work in the
United States. This joint patrol program would help keep the number of
illegal crossings below the agreed threshold.
ENERGY
The collapse of the Northeast power grid in August 2003, depriving 50
million people of electricity for a couple of days, was not attributable to
shortcomings in North American energy integration. But it forced attention
on weak infrastructure. This wake-up call should, among other results, spur
more attention on NAFTA's role in ensuring reliable energy supplies.
The creation of the North American Energy Working Group in 2001 was
a first step towards better energy cooperation within NAFTA. Just as the
European Union drafted its Energy Charter in 1998, NAFTA can start by
building on the Energy Working Group to integrate the North American
energy market. All three NAFTA partners have a stake in this enterprise.
Mexico needs to step up production not only for its own needs, but also to
take advantage of its export opportunities. Canada, even more than Mexico,
can benefit from exporting greater quantities of oil and gas to the United
States.24
The United States has security reasons for diversifying its energy supplies
away from the Middle East. The United States already buys 32 percent of its
oil from Canada and Mexico, but key suppliers outside of North America are
decidedly less stable in their internal politics. These include major producer
countries such as Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela.25 The United States has an interest in promoting a North
American energy agreement because the multilateral sharing mechanisms
contemplated under the International Energy Agency (IEA) could easily
break down in an energy crisis. The problem with the IEA is that the
interests of major energy importers - the United States, Europe, Japan and
24

Canada's Athabasca tar sands are often promoted as a useful check on OPEC. Technical

problems of getting oil from rock, the high water usage, the high costs of producing and
transporting oil from the sands, and the difficulty complying with the Kyoto Protocol, makes
Athabasca a long shot in rivaling Saudi Arabia in oil. Nevertheless, the tar sands have value
as energy insurance. There's oil in them tar sands! - Exploiting Canada's tarsands, THE
ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58583044.
25 In the Iraq conflict, some US allies in the Gulf found their domestic and foreign policy
interests at odds with US strategic considerations. The Bush administration has made it a
priority to fill its 700-million barrels of Strategic Reserves, which now only contains just over
600 million barrels. See, Baker Institute Study: Strategic Energy Policy: Challengesfor the
21' Century, No. 15, THE BORDER PAPERS, April 2001; Also see, Mark Lifsher,
Venezuela Wants Trading Company To Sell Oil in U.S., THE WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003, at
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China - will diverge sharply in the event of prolonged energy shortage.
Moreover, demand has grown rapidly in countries outside the IEA, causing
the agency to lose the critical mass necessary for managing a future shortfall.
While the United States is a net importer from its NAFTA partners, there
is considerable two-way trade. In 2002, when the United States imported
$113 billion of energy from the world, it imported $31 billion of energy
products from Canada and $11.3 from Mexico. In the same year, the United
States sold $5 billion of energy products to Canada (out of total Canadian
energy imports of $11 billion) and $3 billion to Mexico (virtually the total of
Mexican energy imports).
In 2001, Canada supplied about 12 percent of total US energy
consumption and Mexico supplied 3 percent. Canadian exports of natural
gas to the United States (which account for more than 90 percent of total US
imports) provide about 15 percent of US gas consumption. 26 But Canadian
exports are slowing as Canadian domestic demand rises.27 Meanwhile,
facing electricity brownouts and oil and gas shortages, Mexico has the most
acute energy needs in North America to accommodate its industrialization
and urbanization.
Given that coal production is significantly constrained by environmental
concerns, we focus on the dynamics of North American natural gas and oil
energy supplies. For environmental reasons, natural gas is strongly favored
over oil. Nearly all the electric plants built since 1998 in the United States
are run by gas, and Canada already supplies 30 percent of California's
demand for natural gas.28
In 2002, the US Senate proposed an oil and natural gas pipeline from the
Arctic to the lower 48 states. The Alaskan pipeline would be a step forwards
in developing a unified North American energy market. The problem is that
the Canadian government rejects the erstwhile US Senate proposal for a more
expensive "southern route" from northern Alaska to Chicago that would be
heavily subsidized by the US government. The Senate preferred the southern
route because a greater percentage of the line would go through the United
States, creating more jobs for union workers. The alternate "northern route"
26 Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC, Energy Trade With the United States, May 9,

2003, available at www.canadianembassy.org; Paul G. Bradley and G. Campbell Watkins,
Canada and the US: A Seamless Energy Border?, TORONTO: CD HOWE INSTITUTE
COMMENTARY, No. 178, April 2003; CANADIAN NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, (2003); US
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (2003).

27 Under Kyoto as written, Canada cannot export clean energy products, namely
hydropower and natural gas, to the United States to compensate for a 60 million ton gap in
greenhouse emissions. Jeff Rubin and Peter Buchanan, Kyoto Discord: Who Bears the Cost?,
CIBC WORLD MARKETS OCCASIONAL REPORT, No. 36, Nov. 20, 2002.
28 In the first half of 2003, when natural gas prices rose sharply, stored supplies of gas fell
to the lowest levels since 1976. Bradley and Watkins supra note 26.
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provides access to significant Canadian gas reserves, is more direct, and
would cost $2 billion less to build than the southern route. 29 The northern
pipeline, preferred by Canada, would run southeast underwater into the
Northwest Territories, collect gas in the McKenzie Valley and Alberta, and
then run through British Columbia on its way to Chicago. In June 2003,
Imperial Oil signed an agreement with aboriginals, energy companies and
pipeline builders to begin planning for the very early stages of building the
northern pipeline.3 °
Very likely neither the "southern" nor "northern" route will be
economically viable to the private sector without public support. In the
interests of North American energy cooperation, the United States and
Canada should pursue a jointly subsidized pipeline, with public costs shared
on a 50-50 basis. A pipeline contract should include a reasonable mix of
construction workers from the NAFTA region, and the pipe and other
materials should be procured by competitive tender with a limited NAFTA
preference of, say, ten percent.
Another avenue for North American energy cooperation is to expand
Canada-US regional electricity markets and grid networks, while supporting
greater private participation in Mexico's electricity sector.
Canadian
provinces should participate to a greater extent, in regional transmission
organizations (RTOs). Hydro-Quebec, for example, has long profited from
electricity exports to New England and New York. British Columbia Hydro
is now doing the same, with connections to a grid serving the US Northwest
and California, extending into Mexico.31
Progress with Mexico on energy questions will be more difficult. There
are two key obstacles: one is the popular Mexican resistance to amend the
constitutional prohibition against foreign participation in the energy sector.
The other is the job security of Pemex and CFE workers.32 Perhaps the least
29

Canada has several objections to the southern route.

For one, it would bypass the

McKenzie Valley, where there is access to significant proven Canadian reserves. Canada also
prefers to limit government participation in building the pipeline but US proposals for a
southern route would be supported by heavy subsidies. Finally, the Canadian government
objects to the southern route because it assumes that Canada would serve as a land bridge for
Alaskan gas. Bradley and Watkins, supra note 26.
30 TransCanada Pipelines Limited agreed to lend about $55 million to the Aboriginal
Pipeline Group for preliminary work on an arctic gas pipeline through Mackenzie Valley. The
deal also gives TransCanada an option to buy five percent of the Imperial Oil's share of the
pipeline. For information about the latest progress on the northern artic pipeline. CBC NEWS
(2003).
31 Interconnected north-south electricity grids also provide opportunity for seasonal
diversity. British Columbia Hydro's winter peak complements California's summer peak,
allowing B.C. Hydro to export during the summer when it has surplus-generating capacity.
32 Pemex and CFE are both overstaffed to a huge degree, and unless assurances of job
security (or early retirement at full pay) are provided, opening the Mexican energy sector will
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difficult front for making headway is electricity. In 2001, President Fox
attempted to reform Mexico's energy laws by allowing CFE to buy increased
amounts of electricity from private sources. Fox also proposed changes to
the Mexican Constitution to allow private electricity generators to sell
directly to consumers.33 These are steps in the right direction, but they are
small. Mexico should consider a long-term comprehensive transition to a
competitive, electricity market with no restrictions on ownership. At the
same time, Mexico should provide generous early retirement and severance
packages to CFE workers who are laid off. Successful reform of electricity
could then serve as a prototype for eventual private participation in Mexican
oil and gas sectors.
TRADE INTEGRATION
A "strategic bargain" that deepens NAFTA relationships should further
enhance trade integration, even though this has been the spearhead for
NAFTA. In the next phase, NAFTA members should adopt a common
external tariff (CET) on non-agricultural products, a new approach on
antidumping remedies, and make continued progress on agricultural
disputes.34
Common External Tariff
By harmonizing their national tariff rates towards a CET, NAFTA
countries will minimize differences in the MFN (most-favored-nation) tariffs
applied on imports from third countries. In turn, that will eliminate a major
rationale for protective rules of origin.36 While external MFN tariff
be nearly impossible.
33 The Fox administration's new energy reform proposals would encourage new
investment as private sector projects traditionally had to compete with subsidized electricity
provided by the CFE. New Horizons in US-Mexico Relations, US-MEXICO BINATIONAL
COUNCIL, (Sept. 2001).
34 The genesis of the strategic bargain is explained by Dobson, supra note 5, who coined

the term "Big Idea." See, Danielle Goldfarb, The Road to a Canada-US Customs Union:
Step-by-Step or in a Single Bound? TORONTO: CD HOwE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY, No. 184,
THE BORDER PAPERS, June 2003, for an exposition of the CET. In our view, agriculture
protection is both too disparate and too sensitive for common external tariffs in the near term.
35 The CET goal could be reached by a NAFTA accord that all countries would implement
the lowest rate applied by a NAFTA member, for each tariff line within a decade. In the
course of multilateral WTO negotiations, any NAFTA member could, of course, reduce its
tariffs at a faster pace.
36 Rules of origin are justified as a means of preventing "trade deflection,"
namely the
practice of routing imports through the lowest tariff country in an FTA. Unstated is the
intentional protective effect of rules of origin. Despite this intent, it is our hope that rules of
origin would be waived for tariff-free trade within NAFTA, provided that the exporting
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schedules might converge only gradually and some rules of origin might
linger for many years, these changes would be instrumental to eradicate
residual commercial borders that still separate Canada, the United States and
Mexico.
Trade remedies
In the NAFTA negotiations, Canada and Mexico were eager to rein in US
antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) actions.37 They did not
succeed in changing US law, but they did establish a tri-national dispute
settlement system. The dispute settlement provisions do not stop US firms
from filing unfair trade cases against Canada and Mexico (and vice versa).
However, under NAFTA, national AD and CVD actions can be vetted, after
the national agency makes it determination, by impartial NAFTA panels.
Some 85 cases have been handled under Chapter 19 (the dispute system for
AD and CVD actions). Except for lumber and
wheat, the dispute settlement
38
fanfare.
little
with
cases
resolved
has
process
One way to improve the trade remedy atmosphere within NAFTA would
be an accord excludes, by mutual agreement, designated sectors from
recourse to AD or CVD remedies. Excluded sectors would be determined by
industry consultations. For the excluded sectors, safeguard remedies would
still be available, but not AD and CVD duties.
Agriculture
Agricultural trade prospered under NAFTA. US agricultural exports to
NAFTA partners increased by 60 percent during the period 1993 to 2000,
from $8.9 billion to $14.2 billion, a period when US agricultural exports to
the world expanded by only 10 percent. 39 NAFTA agricultural gains were

country did not import a significant quantity of the affected inputs at tariff rates more than
(say) one percentage point lower than the MFN rates applied by the importing country.
37 Canada pushed the same issues, without success, in the Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement. Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, reproduced in 27 I.L.M. 281.
38 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Yee Wong, NAFTA Dispute Settlement Systems,
reprinted in Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Forthcoming. NAFTA: A Ten-Year
Appraisal, WASHINGTON DC: INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, July 2003.

39 US agricultural imports from Canada increased from $4.7 billion in 1993 to $8.7 billion
in 2000, while US imports from Mexico increased from $2.7 billion to $5.1 billion. See,
Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and
Mexico, Dec. 2002, CANADA HOUSE OF COMMONS,

STANDING

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE; US DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL

SERVICE (FATUS) DATABASE (2003).
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most significant in US-Mexico agricultural trade: US agricultural trade with
Mexico nearly doubled between 1993 and 2000.40
By contrast to the US-Canada FTA, which largely excluded agriculture,
Mexico and the United States took far-reaching steps towards complete
liberalization of agricultural trade in NAFTA. As of January 2003, most
tariffs have been phased out. About 90 percent of tariff lines on US
agricultural products entering Mexico are now less than 2 percent.4'
However, liberalization for sensitive products was backloaded.4 2 Mexican
tariffs on corn and dry beans phase-out over a 15-year period, and the United
States insisted on an equally long period for orange juice and sugar. Given
these restraints, in 2000, just eight commodities, some of them minor
agricultural products, represented 55 percent of the value of US-Mexico
agricultural trade: beer, coffee, tomatoes, cattle, peppers, cucumbers, grapes,
cauliflower and broccoli.
NAFTA members are advocating deep agricultural liberalization in the
WTO. The risk is that Doha Round agricultural negotiations will not make
much progress, either on farm subsidies or market access.43 Whatever
progress is made in the WTO, NAFTA will still face its own agricultural
battles.
To illustrate the challenges for NAFTA, we mention two
US-Canadian agricultural battles: softwood lumber and wheat.

40 US agricultural exports to Mexico increased from $3.6 billion in 1993 to $6.5 billion in
2000, while US agricultural imports from Mexico increased from $2.7 billion in 1993 to $5.1
billion in 2000. Much of the growth was associated with US FDI in highly processed foods.
US FDI in the Mexican food processing industry doubled since NAFTA was ratified, from
$2.3 billion in 1993 to $5.3 billion in 1999. See, Steven Zahniser and John Link, The Effects
of NAFTA on Agriculture and the Rural Economy, USDA AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK, July
2002; Rosanna Mentzer Morrison, ed., Food Review: Global Food Trade, USDA ERS FOOD
REVIEW, Vol. 24, No. 3, Dec. 2001.
41 Based on estimates provided by the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C. (2002).
42 US tariffs on wheat, tobacco, cheese, evaporated milk and other products
were
eliminated on January 1, 2003. Mexico will eliminate tariffs on imports of corn and dry beans
by January 1, 2008. The United States will end tariffs on Mexico exports of winter vegetables
by January 2008. The United States has already eliminated tariffs on Mexican exports of corn,
barley, pork and poultry. See, Outlook Report 2002, US DEPT. OF AG. ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE.

43 Illustrating the difficulty of reducing subsidies, the US Farm Act committed the United
States to high subsidies through 2008, and the EU has stated that Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) budget will be frozen until 2013 to accommodate new country members. In 2002, to
placate irate Mexican farmers, President Fox promised to give $1.3 billion in new farm
subsidies.
See, David Luhnow, Mexican Farmers Rage at the Trade Pact,
but the Enemy Is Within, THE WALL ST. J., March 5, 2003, at A 13.
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Softwood Lumber
While lumber is not usually considered an agricultural commodity, the
softwood lumber dispute has elements in common with other agricultural
disputes: significant government regulation coupled with public subsidies.
For all the success of the Chapter 19 process, its most glaring failure and
NAFTA's continuing largest trade dispute involves softwood lumber (SWL).
The economic stakes are huge.
In 2001, Canadian softwood lumber
accounted for one-third of the US market and represented $6.5 billion of
exports annually. 44 The long-running dispute can be traced to different forest
resource management practices. In the United States, timber prices are
determined by private contracts or auctions, in which either the US Forest
Service or private landowners sell the cutting rights. In Canada, most timber
is located on crown (public) lands, and provinces control the crown forests.
The control of forests is used to ensure adequate timber supplies to local
mills, thereby stabilizing employment in mill towns. While the US Forest
Service incurs ancillary costs (such as road maintenance) for harvesting
timber on public lands, Canada's provincial governments shift all forest
management costs to producers. In exchange, stumpage rights are sold at
favorable terms on long-term contracts.
One consequence is a series of trade disputes stretching back to 1982.
The US lumber industry has brought a series of CVD and AD cases; the US
government has imposed penalty duties; and in response the Canadian
government has challenged the duties in the GATT and NAFTA. These
cross-border differences are accentuated by the virtual absence, until
recently, of cross-border investment in the lumber industry. Pragmatic
solutions to the dispute will likely include auction-based provincial timber
sales, open to all bidders, for at least a portion of stumpage rights. 45 When

44 Ironically, the adverse economic consequences of the SWL dispute have made the
Canadian lumber industry more efficient. According to The Economist, average costs
(including US penalty duties) at Canadian mills have been reduced by an estimated $65 per
thousand board feet of lumber (still representing a 20 to 35 percent tax on US consumption of
lumber). As a result, Canadian mills can maintain their market share in the United States
despite their lower profits. Brink Lindsey, Mark A. Goombridge, and Prakash Loungani,
Nailing the Homeowner: The Economic Impact of Trade Protectionof the Softwood Lumber
Industry, CATO INSTITUTE, July 6, 2000.
45 The British Columbia Forestry Revitalization Plan adopts the idea of selling timber
on
an auction-based system for 20 percent of Canada's government-owned timber. Auction
results would then determine stumpage rates for the remaining 80 percent of crown timber.
This new forest policy would resolve a key US complaint that stumpage fees act as a defacto
subsidy by the Canadian government for its softwood lumber producers. See, New British
Columbia Forest Policy Intended to Resolve Softwood Lumber Fight, BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS (BNA) INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Vol. 20, No. 14. April 3, 2003.
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Canada implements market-based lumber pricing measures, the United States
46
will probably scale down its penalty duties on Canadian lumber exports.
Wheat
The US-Canada dispute over wheat could be a harbinger of disputes over
other agricultural products both in US-Canada and US-Mexico trade. The
key issues in wheat revolve around differences in marketing systems and the
political influence of major producers both in the United States and Canada.
The economic stakes are significant. The United States is the world's
leading wheat exporter with an annual value of exports around $3.6 billion in
2002; by comparison, the Canadian Wheat Board's (CWB) annual exports
were about $2.1 billion in 2002.47 A point of bilateral contention is the type
of agricultural subsidy. Whereas the United States subsidizes wheat exports,
the Canadian government subsidizes'the CWB.48 Large private US grain
companies, such as Cargill and Bunge, buy most of the US crop, and sell
wheat around the world.49 In Canada, the CWB acquires virtually all wheat
and barley, and (like its private competitors) sells on a global basis.
In agricultural trade, the United States emphasizes private markets
(although farm incomes are substantially augmented by public subsidies).
By comparison, the CWB is a state trading agency that makes most
marketing decisions, provides quality assurance, and maintains an efficient
grain handling system. US proposals to dismantle the CWB are indirectly
raised in the draft Doha agriculture text and directly raised under the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism. But they are not likely to break the current
impasse between Canada and the United States. 50 As the US government
Lawrence

L.

Herman,

Trade Law Memorandum: Latest Softwood Lumber
Developments, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, July 4, 2003.
47 In 1999, US wheat exports represent about 27 percent of total world exports, while the
CWB supplied about 18 percent of the world wheat and barley exports.
48 As a state trading enterprise and crown corporation, the CWB has special privileges,
including financing guaranteed by the Canadian government and favorable interest rates.
Colin A. Carter, and R.M.A. Loyns, The Canadian Wheat Board: Its Role in North American
State Trading, INSTITUTE OF INTL STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY. Oct. 1998; US Agriculture
Trade: Canadian Wheat Issues, U.S. GAO Oct. 1998.
49 According to the recent US ITC report, Cargill and Continental each own a 29 percent
share of US grain storage capacity; and ADM controls a 28 percent share. Private firms are
gaining importance in the Canadian industry; for example, two US companies own 70 percent
of Canadian milling capacity. US International Trade Commission, Wheat Trading Practices:
Competitive Conditions Between US and Canadian Wheat, Dec. 18, 2001; Darrin Qualman
and Nettie Wiebe, The Structural Adjustment of CanadianAgriculture, CANADIAN CENTER
46

FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, Nov. 2002.
50 Beginning in 1993, under the Canada-US

Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 18 dispute
settlement process, the United States requested a binational panel review of CWB wheat
practices. Following a short-lived US-Canada Memorandum of Understanding on Grains
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admits, even after a state trading enterprise like the Australian Wheat Board
has been abandoned, monopoly trading practices in wheat will likely
persist. 5 1 Rather than getting rid of CWB, a political compromise might

require the CWB to adopt transparent wheat prices in exchange for the
elimination of US export subsidies in wheat.
INSTITUTIONAL DEPTH
A comparison between NAFTA and EU institutions illustrates how North
America's future will be distinct from Europe's. Brussels is the headquarters
cities for most EU institutions (however, the European Central Bank is
headquartered in Frankfurt and the European Parliament has chambers both
in Strasbourg and Brussels). EU institutions employ 19,000 persons and
dispose very large budgets. By contrast, NAFTA deliberately scattered its
institutions throughout North America -- Montreal, San Antonio, Mexico
City, Ottawa, and Washington, DC, and they are modest in scope, with total
employment under 1,000 persons.
NAFTA governments have no desire to create supra-national institutions
modeled along EU lines. Given that limitation, NAFTA can still advance
integration through efforts that address income disparities and foster joint
policy coordination. As the EU Cohesion Fund (1994) was used to help
integrate poorer countries, NAFTA can similarly enlarge its funding for the
North American Development Bank (NADBank). NADBank's capital base
should be increased from $4.5 billion to $10 billion. Recognizing disparities
in income, funding should be based. on a 75-25 split between the United
States and Mexico, rather than 50-50. 52
In the near term, a common currency is not a realistic goal. This is in
contrast to the EU. As the North American economies become more
integrated, the case for a single currency will grow stronger. But the
predominance of the US economy in the region - accounting for almost 90
percent of North American GDP - makes the US government reluctant to
share control over monetary policy with Canada and Mexico. On the other
hand, if Mexico and Canada dollarize with no sharing of monetary control or
central bank earnings, they will surrender an important symbol of
sovereignty and lose seignorage to boot.

(1994), the United States finally in 2003 filed formal charges against the CWB in the WTO.
51 United States, Australia Discuss Farm Programs, Medicines in First Round of Free
Trade Talks, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Vol.

20, No. 13, March 27, 2003.
52 As a comparison, in 1999, the European Structural Funds program budget was 195
billion Euros, representing 1.27 percent of the EU's GDP. Robert A. Pastor, Toward a North
American Community. WASHINGTON, DC: INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2001).
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Our view is that NAFTA members should deepen their institutional
relations through a different track - by welcoming each other's officials as
non-voting observers on the boards of important agencies. US agencies we
propose for consideration are the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
International Trade Commission (ITC), the Federal Reserve Board, together
with their Canadian and Mexican counterparts. 53 This low-key, but still
significant step, would establish a basis for closer cooperation in a number of
functional areas.
CONCLUSION
If the United States views NAFTA solely as a trade and investment
arrangement, and not the first large step towards deeper integration, much of
the potential for North American economic and social life will be lost.
Pastor (2002) persuasively argues that a major shortcoming of NAFTA, so
far as Mexico is concerned, is the absence of funding mechanisms to promote
development. He contends that the United States should make Mexico's
development an explicit priority, both for its own sake and to make progress
on issues that are important to the United States, especially drug trafficking
and illegal immigration.
The NAFTA partners took concrete steps to secure the safety of trade and
travel after September 11. NEXUS and FAST initiatives should now be
extended. Energy should be added to the agenda, with high-level policy
coordination between the United States, Canada and Mexico. NAFTA
should foster the opening of Mexico's electricity sector, the United States
and Canada should agree upon a jointly acceptable pipeline route.
Commonly agreed immigration policies should be a long-term objective.
As NAFTA partners work towards harmonizing visa rules, the United States
and Mexico can tackle the sensitive issue of illegal immigration. A
US-Mexico immigration accord can make progress by offering temporary
work permits for guest workers and extending permanent residency to 4.5
million undocumented Mexicans living and working in the United States,
both conditioned on a reduction in the annual number of border
apprehensions.

53 Counterpart governmental bodies in Canada and Mexico include: Canadian Center for
Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS), the Bank of Canada, Canadian Trade Facilitation
Office, Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT), Mexican Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare, Health Canada, Mexican Ministry of Health, Federal Commission for
Protection from Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS), Mexican Ministry of Economy (SECOFI), and
the Banco de Mexico.
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On the trade front, NAFTA can move towards a common external tariff
for non-agricultural products. They can deal with trade remedies by
agreement that trouble-free sectors will only be subject to safeguards, not
countervailing or antidumping duties. They can continue to work through
the long list of agricultural disputes.
Short of creating supra-national institutions, the NAFTA members can
deepen their institutional ties by inviting each other's officials as non-voting
members on key agencies, such as the EPA and the Fed.

